mirror of
https://git.code.sf.net/p/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils
synced 2025-04-27 14:22:31 +02:00
Add tests for MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks
Add tests to ensure that, after applying the kernel patch 'ima: Align
ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook', the MMAP_CHECK hook
checks the protections applied by the kernel and not those requested by the
application.
Also ensure that after applying 'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook',
the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook checks the protections requested by the
application.
Test both with the test_mmap application that by default requests the
PROT_READ protection flag. Its syntax is:
test_mmap <file> <mode>
where mode can be:
- exec: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to mmap()
- read_implies_exec: calls the personality() system call with
READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument before mmap()
- mprotect: adds the PROT_EXEC protection flag to a memory area in addition
to PROT_READ
- exec_on_writable: calls mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file which has a
writable mapping
Check the different combinations of hooks/modes and ensure that a
measurement entry is found in the IMA measurement list only when it is
expected. No measurement entry should be found when only the PROT_READ
protection flag is requested or the matching policy rule has the
MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook and the personality() system call was called with
READ_IMPLIES_EXEC.
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on an existing memory area protected with
PROT_READ should be denied (with an appraisal rule), regardless of the MMAP
hook specified in the policy. The same applies for mmap() with PROT_EXEC on
a file with a writable mapping.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Roberto Sassu
Mimi Zohar
parent
6a658e23d6
commit
6917e384d3
@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ check_SCRIPTS =
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TESTS = $(check_SCRIPTS)
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check_SCRIPTS += ima_hash.test sign_verify.test boot_aggregate.test \
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fsverity.test portable_signatures.test ima_policy_check.test
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fsverity.test portable_signatures.test ima_policy_check.test \
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mmap_check.test
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check_PROGRAMS := test_mmap
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.PHONY: check_logs
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check_logs:
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407
tests/mmap_check.test
Executable file
407
tests/mmap_check.test
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#
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# Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
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#
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# Check the behavior of MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT
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trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup _cleanup_env cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT
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PATCHES=(
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'ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook'
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'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook'
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)
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RET_INVALID_RULE=$((0x0001))
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RET_RULE_OVERLAP=$((0x0002))
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RET_SAME_RULE_EXISTS=$((0x0004))
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EVM_INIT_HMAC=$((0x0001))
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EVM_INIT_X509=$((0x0002))
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# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
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VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
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# Errors defined in test_mmap
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ERR_SETUP=1
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ERR_TEST=2
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cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
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export PATH=$PWD/../src:$PWD:$PATH
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export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
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. ./functions.sh
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_require evmctl
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cleanup() {
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if [ "$g_loop_mounted" = "1" ]; then
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popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
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umount "$g_mountpoint"
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fi
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if [ -n "$g_dev" ]; then
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losetup -d "$g_dev"
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fi
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if [ -n "$g_image" ]; then
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rm -f "$g_image"
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fi
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if [ -n "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
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rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint"
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fi
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if [ -n "$g_key_path_der" ]; then
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rm -f "$g_key_path_der"
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fi
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}
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# Use the fsuuid= IMA policy keyword to select only files created/used by the
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# tests below. Also use fowner= to differentiate between files created/used by
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# individual tests.
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IMA_UUID="28b23254-9467-44c0-b6ba-34b12e85a26e"
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MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER=2000
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MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER=2001
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MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
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MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
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APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER=2002
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APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER=2003
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APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
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APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
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check_load_ima_rule() {
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local result new_policy color
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echo -e "$1\n$(cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy)" | ima_policy_check.awk
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result=$?
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if [ $((result & RET_INVALID_RULE)) -eq $RET_INVALID_RULE ]; then
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echo "${RED}Invalid rule${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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if [ $((result & RET_RULE_OVERLAP)) -eq $RET_RULE_OVERLAP ]; then
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color=${YELLOW}
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if [ -n "$TST_ENV" ]; then
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color=${RED}
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fi
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echo "${color}Possible interference with existing IMA policy rule${NORM}"
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if [ -n "$TST_ENV" ]; then
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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fi
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if [ $((result & RET_SAME_RULE_EXISTS)) -eq $RET_SAME_RULE_EXISTS ]; then
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return "$OK"
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fi
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new_policy=$(mktemp -p "$g_mountpoint")
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echo "$1" > "$new_policy"
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echo "$new_policy" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
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result=$?
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rm -f "$new_policy"
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if [ "$result" -ne 0 ]; then
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echo "${RED}Failed to set IMA policy${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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return "$OK"
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}
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check_mmap() {
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local hook="$1"
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local arg="$2"
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local test_file fowner rule result test_file_entry
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echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
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if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
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echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
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return "$FAIL"
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fi
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fowner="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
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rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
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if [ "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ]; then
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fowner="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
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rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
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fi
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if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
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result=$?
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if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
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return $result
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fi
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test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
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result=$?
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if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
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echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
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echo -n "Result (expect found): "
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else
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echo -n "Result (expect not found): "
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fi
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test_file_entry=$(awk '$5 == "'"$test_file"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
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if [ -z "$test_file_entry" ]; then
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if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
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echo "${RED}not found${NORM}"
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else
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echo "${GREEN}not found${NORM}"
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fi
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return "$FAIL"
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fi
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if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
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echo "${GREEN}found${NORM}"
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else
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echo "${RED}found${NORM}"
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fi
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if [ "$VERBOSE" -gt 0 ]; then
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echo "$test_file_entry"
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fi
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return "$OK"
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}
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check_deny() {
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local hook="$1"
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local arg="$2"
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local test_file fowner rule result
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echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
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if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
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echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
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return "$FAIL"
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fi
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if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --key "$g_key_path" "$test_file" &> /dev/null; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot sign $test_file${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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fowner="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
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rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
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if [ "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ]; then
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fowner="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
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rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
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fi
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if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
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result=$?
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if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
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return $result
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fi
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test_mmap "$test_file" exec
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result=$?
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if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
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echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
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result=$?
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if [ $result -ne 0 ] && [ $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ]; then
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echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
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return "$HARDFAIL"
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fi
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if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
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echo -n "Result (expect denied): "
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else
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echo -n "Result (expect allowed): "
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fi
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if [ $result -eq 0 ]; then
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if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
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echo "${RED}allowed${NORM}"
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else
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echo "${GREEN}allowed${NORM}"
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fi
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return "$FAIL"
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fi
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if [ "$TFAIL" != "yes" ]; then
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echo "${GREEN}denied${NORM}"
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else
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echo "${RED}denied${NORM}"
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fi
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return "$OK"
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}
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# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set.
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_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH"
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# Exit from the creator of the new environment.
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_exit_env "$TST_KERNEL"
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# Mount filesystems in the new environment.
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_init_env
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if [ "$(whoami)" != "root" ]; then
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echo "${CYAN}This script must be executed as root${NORM}"
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exit "$SKIP"
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fi
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if [ ! -f /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy ]; then
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echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file not found${NORM}"
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exit "$SKIP"
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fi
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if ! cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy &> /dev/null; then
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echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file is not readable${NORM}"
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exit "$SKIP"
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fi
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if [ -n "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
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if [ "${TST_KEY_PATH:0:1}" != "/" ]; then
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echo "${RED}Absolute path required for the signing key${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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if [ ! -f "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
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echo "${RED}Kernel signing key not found in $TST_KEY_PATH${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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g_key_path="$TST_KEY_PATH"
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elif [ -f "$PWD/../signing_key.pem" ]; then
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g_key_path="$PWD/../signing_key.pem"
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elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
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g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem"
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elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
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g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem"
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else
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echo "${CYAN}Kernel signing key not found${NORM}"
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exit "$SKIP"
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fi
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evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm)
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if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -eq "$EVM_INIT_X509" ]; then
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if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_HMAC" ]; then
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echo "${CYAN}Incompatible EVM mode $evm_value${NORM}"
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exit "$SKIP"
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fi
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fi
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g_key_path_der=$(mktemp)
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openssl x509 -in "$g_key_path" -out "$g_key_path_der" -outform der
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if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.ima < "$g_key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
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echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the IMA keyring${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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g_mountpoint=$(mktemp -d)
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g_image=$(mktemp)
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if [ -z "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
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echo "${RED}Mountpoint directory not created${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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if ! dd if=/dev/zero of="$g_image" bs=1M count=20 &> /dev/null; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot create test image${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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g_dev=$(losetup -f "$g_image" --show)
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if [ -z "$g_dev" ]; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot create loop device${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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if ! mkfs.ext4 -U "$IMA_UUID" -b 4096 "$g_dev" &> /dev/null; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot format $g_dev${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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if ! mount -o iversion "$g_dev" "$g_mountpoint"; then
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echo "${RED}Cannot mount loop device${NORM}"
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exit "$FAIL"
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fi
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g_loop_mounted=1
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pushd "$g_mountpoint" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
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# Ensure that IMA does not add a new measurement entry if an application calls
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# mmap() with PROT_READ, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
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# In this case, both the protections requested by the application and the final
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# protections applied by the kernel contain only PROT_READ, so there is no
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# match with the IMA rule, which expects PROT_EXEC to be set.
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expect_fail check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" ""
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# Ensure that IMA adds a new measurement entry if an application calls mmap()
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# with PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
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expect_pass check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "exec"
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# Same as in the first test, but in this case the application calls the
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# personality() system call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC, which causes the kernel to
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# add PROT_EXEC in the final protections passed to the MMAP_CHECK hook.
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#
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# Ensure that the bug introduced by 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final
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# protections in security_mmap_file() into a helper") is fixed, by passing the
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# final protections again to the MMAP_CHECK hook. Due to the bug, the hook
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# received the protections requested by the application. Since those protections
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# don't have PROT_EXEC, IMA was not creating a measurement entry.
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expect_pass_if '0' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "read_implies_exec"
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# Repeat the previous three tests, but with the new MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook,
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# which behaves like the buggy MMAP_CHECK hook. In the third test, expect that
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# no new measurement entry is created, since the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook sees
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# the protections requested by the application (PROT_READ).
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expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ""
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expect_pass_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec"
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expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "read_implies_exec"
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# Ensure that IMA refuses an mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on a memory area
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# obtained with an mmap() with PROT_READ. This is due to the inability of IMA
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# to measure/appraise the file for which mmap() was called (locking issue).
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expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "mprotect"
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# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
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# previous test.
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expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "mprotect"
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# Ensure that there cannot be an mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file with writable
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# mappings, due to the inability of IMA to make a reliable measurement of that
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# file.
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expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "exec_on_writable"
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# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
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# previous test.
|
||||
expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec_on_writable"
|
||||
128
tests/test_mmap.c
Normal file
128
tests/test_mmap.c
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
|
||||
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Tool to test IMA MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#include <fcntl.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/mman.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/personality.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Convention: return 1 for errors that should not occur, as they are
|
||||
* setup-related, return 2 for errors that might occur due to testing
|
||||
* conditions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define ERR_SETUP 1
|
||||
#define ERR_TEST 2
|
||||
|
||||
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct stat st;
|
||||
void *ptr, *ptr_write = NULL;
|
||||
int ret, fd, fd_write, prot = PROT_READ;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!argv[1]) {
|
||||
printf("Missing file parameter\n");
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "read_implies_exec")) {
|
||||
ret = personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
|
||||
if (ret == -1) {
|
||||
printf("Failed to set personality, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
-errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (stat(argv[1], &st) == -1) {
|
||||
printf("Failed to access %s, err: %d (%s)\n", argv[1], -errno,
|
||||
strerror(errno));
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable")) {
|
||||
fd_write = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
|
||||
if (fd_write == -1) {
|
||||
printf("Failed to open %s in r/w, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ptr_write = mmap(0, st.st_size, PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
|
||||
fd_write, 0);
|
||||
close(fd_write);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ptr_write == MAP_FAILED) {
|
||||
printf("Failed mmap() with PROT_WRITE on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
|
||||
if (fd == -1) {
|
||||
printf("Failed to open %s in ro, err: %d (%s)\n", argv[1],
|
||||
-errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
|
||||
if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1)
|
||||
printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (argv[2] && !strncmp(argv[2], "exec", 4))
|
||||
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
|
||||
|
||||
ptr = mmap(0, st.st_size, prot, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
close(fd);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1) {
|
||||
printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
|
||||
ret = ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "exec_on_writable") &&
|
||||
errno == EACCES)
|
||||
ret = ERR_TEST;
|
||||
else
|
||||
printf("Failed mmap() with PROT_READ%s on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
(prot & PROT_EXEC) ? " | PROT_EXEC" : "",
|
||||
argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (argv[2] && !strcmp(argv[2], "mprotect")) {
|
||||
ret = mprotect(ptr, st.st_size, PROT_EXEC);
|
||||
if (ret == -1) {
|
||||
ret = ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
if (errno == EPERM)
|
||||
ret = ERR_TEST;
|
||||
else
|
||||
printf("Unexpected mprotect() error on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (munmap(ptr, st.st_size) == -1) {
|
||||
printf("Failed munmap() of mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
|
||||
argv[1], -errno, strerror(errno));
|
||||
return ERR_SETUP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user