ima-evm-utils-mirror/tests/portable_signatures.test

#!/bin/bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#
# Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
#
# Check if operations on files with EVM portable signatures succeed.

trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup _cleanup_env cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT

# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE="${TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE:-0}"

# From security/integrity/evm/evm.h in kernel source directory.
(( EVM_INIT_HMAC=0x0001 ))
(( EVM_INIT_X509=0x0002 ))
(( EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES=0x0004 ))
(( EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE=0x80000000 ))

cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit "$FAIL"
export PATH=$PWD/../src:$PWD/../mount-idmapped:$PATH
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
. ./functions.sh
_require evmctl

cleanup() {
	if [ "$g_loop_mounted" = "1" ]; then
		popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"

		if [ -n "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" ]; then
			umount "$g_mountpoint_idmapped"
		fi

		umount "$g_mountpoint"
	fi

	if [ -n "$g_dev" ]; then
		losetup -d "$g_dev"
	fi

	if [ -n "$g_image" ]; then
		rm -f "$g_image"
	fi

	if [ -n "$key_path_der" ]; then
		rm -f "$key_path_der"
	fi

	if [ -n "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
		rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint"
	fi

	if [ -n "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" ]; then
		rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint_idmapped"
	fi
}

get_xattr() {
	local format="hex"

	if [ "$1" = "security.selinux" ]; then
		format="text"
	fi

	getfattr -n "$1" -e $format -d "$2" 2> /dev/null | awk -F "=" '$1 == "'"$1"'" {if ("'$format'" == "hex") v=substr($2, 3); else { split($2, temp, "\""); v=temp[2] }; print v}'
}

# Use the fsuuid= IMA policy keyword to select only files created/used by the
# tests below. Also use fowner= to differentiate between files created/used by
# individual tests.
IMA_UUID="28b23254-9467-44c0-b6ba-34b12e85a26d"
APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER=2000
APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE="appraise fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER appraise_type=imasig"
MEASURE_FOWNER=2001
MEASURE_RULE="measure fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MEASURE_FOWNER template=ima-sig"
APPRAISE_FOWNER=2002
APPRAISE_RULE="appraise fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_FOWNER"
METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER=3001
METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER_2=3002

check_load_ima_rule() {
	local rule_loaded
	local result
	local new_policy

	rule_loaded=$(grep "$1" /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy)
	if [ -z "$rule_loaded" ]; then
		new_policy=$(mktemp -p "$g_mountpoint")
		echo "$1" > "$new_policy"
		evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imasig --key "$key_path" "$new_policy" &> /dev/null
		echo "$new_policy" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
		result=$?
		rm -f "$new_policy"

		if [ "$result" -ne 0 ]; then
			echo "${RED}Failed to set IMA policy${NORM}"
			return "$FAIL"
		fi
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

# The purpose of this test is to verify that the patch 'ima: Allow imasig
# requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures' didn't break the
# current behavior (IMA signatures still satisfy the imasig requirement).
check_ima_sig_appraisal() {
	local result

	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if [ $((evm_value & (EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_INIT_HMAC))) -ne 0 ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode 0 required${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chown "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE"
	result=$?
	if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
		return $result
	fi

	# Check if appraisal works.
	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Ensure that files with IMA signature cannot be updated (immutable).
	if echo "test" 2> /dev/null >> test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Write to test-file should not succeed (immutable file)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_ima_sig_appraisal() {
	rm -f test-file
}

# Requires:
# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
#
# The purpose of this test is to verify that the patch 'ima: Introduce template
# field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback' still allows IMA signatures
# to be displayed in the measurement list.
check_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
	local result
	local ima_sig_fs
	local ima_sig_list

	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --imasig --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chown "$MEASURE_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	check_load_ima_rule "$MEASURE_RULE"
	result=$?
	if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
		return $result
	fi

	# Read the file to add it to the measurement list.
	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	ima_sig_fs=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
	if [ -z "$ima_sig_fs" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Search security.ima in the measurement list.
	ima_sig_list=$(awk '$6 == "'"$ima_sig_fs"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
	if [ -z "$ima_sig_list" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.ima mismatch (xattr != measurement list)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
	rm -f test-file
}

# Requires:
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
#
# The purpose of this test is to verify that new files can be created when EVM
# is initialized only with a public key.
check_create_file() {
	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	# To trigger the bug we need to enable public key verification without HMAC key loaded.
	if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) -eq "$EVM_INIT_HMAC" ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_HMAC must be disabled${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_create_file() {
	rm -f test-file
}

# Requires:
# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
#
# The purpose of this test is to verify that EVM with the patches above allows
# metadata to copied one by one, even if the portable signature verification
# temporarily fails until the copy is completed.
check_cp_preserve_xattrs() {
	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if [ "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Check if cp is allowed to set metadata for the new file.
	if ! cp -a test-file test-file.copy; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot copy test-file with attrs/xattrs preserved${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_cp_preserve_xattrs() {
	rm -f test-file test-file.copy
}

# Requires:
# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
#
# The purpose of this test is similar to that of the previous test, with the
# difference that tar is used instead of cp. One remark is that the owner is
# intentionally different (or it should be) from the current owner, to
# incrementally test the patches without 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr()
# for unmodified metadata'.
check_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner() {
	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if [ "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! mkdir in out; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot create directories${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > in/test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chown 3000 in/test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chmod 600 in/test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" in/test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar in/test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Check if tar is allowed to set metadata for the extracted file.
	# Ensure that the owner from the archive is different from the
	# owner of the extracted file to avoid that portable signature
	# verification succeeds before restoring original metadata
	# (a patch allows modification of immutable metadata if portable
	# signature verification fails).
	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner() {
	rm -Rf in out test-archive.tar
}

# Requires:
# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
# - evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks
# - evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
#
# The purpose of this test is similar to that of the previous two tests. The
# difference is that tar is used instead of cp, and the extracted files have
# the same owner as the current one. Thus, this test requires 'evm: Allow
# setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata'.
check_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner() {
	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if [ "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! mkdir in out; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot create directories${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > in/test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" in/test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar in/test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Check if tar is allowed to set metadata for the extracted file.
	# This test is different from the previous one, as the owner
	# from the archive is the same of the owner of the extracted
	# file. tar will attempt anyway to restore the original owner but
	# unlike the previous test, portable signature verification already
	# succeeds at the time the owner is set (another patch allows
	# metadata operations if those operations don't modify current
	# values).
	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner() {
	rm -Rf in out test-archive.tar
}

# Requires:
# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
# - evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks
# - evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata
# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
#
# The purpose of this test is to further verify the patches above, by executing
# commands to set the same or different metadata. Setting the same metadata
# should be allowed, setting different metadata should be denied.
check_metadata_change() {
	local ima_xattr
	local label
	local last_char
	local msg

	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if [ "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chown "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chgrp "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change group of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chmod 2644 test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# If metadata modification is not allowed, EVM should deny any
	# operation that modifies metadata. Check if setting the same
	# value is allowed.
	if ! chown "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot set same owner for test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Setting a different value should not be allowed.
	if chown "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER_2" test-file 2> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Owner change for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Repeat the test for the file mode.
	if ! chmod 2644 test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot set same mode for test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if chmod 2666 test-file 2> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Mode change for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if [ -n "$(command -v chcon 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ -n "$(command -v getenforce 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ "$(getenforce 2> /dev/null)" != "Disabled" ]; then
		# Repeat the test for the SELinux label.
		label=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file)

		if [ -n "$label" ]; then
			if ! chcon "$label" test-file; then
				echo "${RED}Cannot set same security.selinux for test-file${NORM}"
				return "$FAIL"
			fi
		fi

		if chcon unconfined_u:object_r:null_device_t:s0 test-file 2> /dev/null; then
			echo "${RED}security.selinux change for test file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
			return "$FAIL"
		fi
	fi

	# Repeat the test for the IMA signature.
	ima_xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
	if [ -z "$ima_xattr" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot set same security.ima for test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	last_char=${ima_xattr: -1}
	((last_char += 1))
	((last_char %= 10))
	ima_xattr=${ima_xattr:0:-1}$last_char

	if setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr" test-file 2> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Change of security.ima for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Repeat the test for ACLs.
	if ! msg=$(exec 2>&1 && setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file); then
		if [ "${msg%not supported}" != "$msg" ]; then
			return "$OK"
		fi

		echo "${RED}Cannot preserve system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file 2> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Change of system.posix_acl_access for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if [ -n "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" ]; then
		pushd "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"

		# Repeat the test for ACLs on an idmapped mount.
		#
		# This test relies on the fact that the caller of this script (root) is in
		# the same owning group of test-file (in the idmapped mount the group is
		# root, not $METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER and, for this reason, the S_ISGID bit
		# is not cleared. If EVM was not aware of the mapping, it would have
		# determined that root is not in the owning group of test-file and given
		# that also CAP_FSETID is cleared, the S_ISGID bit would have been cleared
		# and thus the operation would fail (file metadata changed).
		if ! capsh --drop='cap_fsetid' -- -c 'setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-file'; then
			echo "${RED}Cannot preserve system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}"
			popd || exit "$FAIL"
			return "$FAIL"
		fi

		popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_metadata_change() {
	rm -f test-file
}

# Requires:
# - evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status()
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
#
# Note:
# This test can be run if EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set in advance
# before running this script. If it is not set before, this script sets
# EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE, disabling further EVM mode modifications until reboot.
#
# Without EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES, EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is necessary to ignore
# the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL and INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS errors.
#
# The purpose of this test is to verify that IMA detected a metadata change
# when EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set (metadata operations are always
# allowed). After the first successful appraisal, the test intentionally changes
# metadata and verifies that IMA revoked access to the file. The test also
# verifies that IMA grants access again to the file after restoring the correct
# metadata.
check_evm_revalidate() {
	local result
	local ima_xattr
	local ima_xattr_new
	local evm_xattr
	local evm_xattr_new
	local label
	local last_char
	local msg

	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if [ "$evm_value" -ne $((EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $((EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) required, execute echo 4 > /sys/kernel/security/evm before running this test${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chmod 600 test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# We need to defer setting the correct owner, as there could be
	# already an IMA policy rule preventing evmctl from reading the
	# file to calculate the digest.
	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --uid "$APPRAISE_FOWNER" --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chown "$APPRAISE_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_RULE"
	result=$?
	if [ $result -ne "$OK" ]; then
		return $result
	fi

	# Read the file so that IMA would not re-appraise it next time.
	if ! cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# After enabling metadata modification, operations should succeed even
	# if the file has a portable signature. However, the previously cached
	# appraisal status should be invalidated.
	if ! chmod 644 test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Here check if IMA re-appraised the file. The read should fail
	# since now file metadata is invalid.
	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid mode)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Restore metadata back to the original value.
	if ! chmod 600 test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original mode of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Ensure that now IMA appraisal succeeds.
	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct mode${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if [ -n "$(command -v chcon 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ -n "$(command -v getenforce 2> /dev/null)" ] && [ "$(getenforce 2> /dev/null)" != "Disabled" ]; then
		# Repeat the test for the SELinux label.
		label=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file)

		if ! chcon unconfined_u:object_r:null_device_t:s0 test-file; then
			echo "${RED}Cannot change security.selinux of test-file${NORM}"
			return "$FAIL"
		fi

		if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
			echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.selinux)${NORM}"
			return "$FAIL"
		fi

		if [ -n "$label" ]; then
			if ! chcon "$label" test-file; then
				echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.selinux of test-file${NORM}"
				return "$FAIL"
			fi
		else
			attr -S -r selinux test-file
		fi

		if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
			echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.selinux${NORM}"
			return "$FAIL"
		fi
	fi

	# Repeat the test for the IMA signature.
	ima_xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
	if [ -z "$ima_xattr" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	last_char=${ima_xattr: -1}
	((last_char += 1))
	((last_char %= 10))
	ima_xattr_new=${ima_xattr:0:-1}$last_char

	if ! setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr_new" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot set security.ima of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.ima)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.ima of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.ima${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Repeat the test for the EVM signature.
	evm_xattr=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file)
	if [ -z "$evm_xattr" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.evm not found${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	last_char=${evm_xattr: -1}
	((last_char += 1))
	((last_char %= 10))
	evm_xattr_new=${evm_xattr:0:-1}$last_char

	if ! setfattr -n security.evm -v 0x"$evm_xattr_new" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot set security.evm of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.evm)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! setfattr -n security.evm -v 0x"$evm_xattr" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.evm of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.evm${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Repeat the test for ACLs.
	if ! setfacl -m u::rwx test-file 2> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change system.posix_acl_access${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid system.posix_acl_access)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! setfacl -m u::rw test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct system.posix_acl_access${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_evm_revalidate() {
	rm -f test-file
}

# Requires:
# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
# - evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status()
# - ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
#
# The purpose of this test is to verify that IMA manages files with an EVM
# portable signature similarly to those with an IMA signature: content can be
# written to new files after adding the signature and files can be accessed
# when the imasig requirement is specified in the IMA policy.
check_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal() {
	local result
	local xattr_orig
	local xattr
	local mode
	local owner

	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ]; then
		echo "${CYAN}EVM flag $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
		return "$SKIP"
	fi

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chmod 600 test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# We need to defer setting the correct owner, as there could be
	# already an IMA policy rule preventing evmctl from reading the
	# file to calculate the digest.
	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --uid "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chown "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE"
	result=$?
	if [ "$result" -ne "$OK" ]; then
		return "$result"
	fi

	# Ensure that a file with a portable signature satisfies the
	# appraise_type=imasig requirement specified in the IMA policy.
	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Even files with a portable signature should be considered as
	# immutable by IMA. Write should fail.
	if echo "test" 2> /dev/null >> test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Write to test-file should not succeed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	mkdir out

	# Appraisal of the new file, extracted by tar, should succeed
	# not only if the new file has an IMA signature but also if
	# it has a portable signature.
	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Check if xattrs have been correctly set.
	xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file)
	xattr=$(get_xattr security.selinux out/test-file)
	if [ "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.selinux mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
	xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima out/test-file)
	if [ "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.ima mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file)
	xattr=$(get_xattr security.evm out/test-file)
	if [ "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.evm mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Check if attrs have been correctly set.
	owner=$(stat -c "%u" out/test-file)
	if [ "$owner" != "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" ]; then
		echo "${RED}owner mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	mode=$(stat -c "%a" out/test-file)
	if [ "$mode" != "600" ]; then
		echo "${RED}mode mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal() {
	rm -f test-file test-archive.tar
	rm -Rf out
}

# Requires:
# - ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback
# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
#
# The purpose of this test is to verify that the EVM portable signature is
# displayed in the measurement list.
check_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
	local result
	local evm_sig_fs
	local evm_sig_list

	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME[0]} (evm_value: $evm_value)"

	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! chown "$MEASURE_FOWNER" test-file; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	check_load_ima_rule "$MEASURE_RULE"
	result=$?
	if [ "$result" -ne "$OK" ]; then
		return "$result"
	fi

	# Invalidate previous measurement to add new entry
	touch test-file

	# Read the file to add it to the measurement list.
	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	evm_sig_fs=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file)
	if [ -z "$evm_sig_fs" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.evm not found${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	# Search security.evm in the measurement list.
	evm_sig_list=$(awk '$6 == "'"$evm_sig_fs"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
	if [ -z "$evm_sig_list" ]; then
		echo "${RED}security.evm mismatch (xattr != measurement list)${NORM}"
		return "$FAIL"
	fi

	return "$OK"
}

cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
	rm -f test-file
}

# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set.
_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH"

# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set (skipped test).
_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH TST_LIST=check_evm_revalidate"

# Exit from the creator of the new environment.
_exit_env "$TST_KERNEL"

# Mount filesystems in the new environment.
_init_env

g_mountpoint=$(mktemp -d)
g_image=$(mktemp)

if [ -z "$g_mountpoint" ]; then
	echo "${RED}Mountpoint directory not created${NORM}"
	exit "$FAIL"
fi

if [ "$(whoami)" != "root" ]; then
	echo "${CYAN}This script must be executed as root${NORM}"
	exit "$SKIP"
fi

if [ -n "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
	if [ "${TST_KEY_PATH:0:1}" != "/" ]; then
		echo "${RED}Absolute path required for the signing key${NORM}"
		exit "$FAIL"
	fi

	if [ ! -f "$TST_KEY_PATH" ]; then
		echo "${RED}Kernel signing key not found in $TST_KEY_PATH${NORM}"
		exit "$FAIL"
	fi

	key_path="$TST_KEY_PATH"
elif [ -f "$PWD/../signing_key.pem" ]; then
	key_path="$PWD/../signing_key.pem"
elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
	key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem"
elif [ -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem" ]; then
	key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem"
else
	echo "${CYAN}Kernel signing key not found${NORM}"
	exit "$SKIP"
fi

key_path_der=$(mktemp)

if [ ! -f "/sys/kernel/security/evm" ]; then
	echo "${CYAN}EVM support in the kernel disabled${NORM}"
	exit "$SKIP"
fi

# Assume that the EVM mode can be changed in a new environment.
if [ -n "$TST_ENV" ]; then
	TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=1
fi

evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm)

openssl x509 -in "$key_path" -out "$key_path_der" -outform der
if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.ima < "$key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
	echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the IMA keyring${NORM}"
	exit "$FAIL"
fi

if ! dd if=/dev/zero of="$g_image" bs=1M count=20 &> /dev/null; then
	echo "${RED}Cannot create test image${NORM}"
	exit "$FAIL"
fi

g_dev=$(losetup -f "$g_image" --show)
if [ -z "$g_dev" ]; then
	echo "${RED}Cannot create loop device${NORM}"
	exit "$FAIL"
fi

if ! mkfs.ext4 -U "$IMA_UUID" -b 4096 "$g_dev" &> /dev/null; then
	echo "${RED}Cannot format $g_dev${NORM}"
	exit "$FAIL"
fi

if ! mount -o i_version "$g_dev" "$g_mountpoint"; then
	echo "${RED}Cannot mount loop device${NORM}"
	exit "$FAIL"
fi

if [ -n "$(command -v mount-idmapped 2> /dev/null)" ]; then
	echo "Found mount-idmapped at $(command -v mount-idmapped), testing idmapped mounts"
	g_mountpoint_idmapped=$(mktemp -d)
	if ! mount-idmapped --map-mount b:"$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER":0:1 "$g_mountpoint" "$g_mountpoint_idmapped"; then
		echo "${RED}mount-idmapped failed${NORM}"
		exit "$FAIL"
	fi
fi

g_loop_mounted=1
pushd "$g_mountpoint" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"

expect_pass check_ima_sig_appraisal
cleanup_ima_sig_appraisal
expect_pass check_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list
cleanup_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list

if [ "$(echo -e "$(uname -r)\n5.12" | sort -V | head -n 1)" != "5.12" ]; then
	exit "$OK"
fi

if [ $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ] && [ "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ]; then
	if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.evm < "$key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
		echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the EVM keyring${NORM}"
		exit "$FAIL"
	fi

	echo "$EVM_INIT_X509" > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null
fi

if [ "$(expr index "$TST_LIST" "check_evm_revalidate")" -gt 0 ] && [ "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ]; then
	echo "$EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES" > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null
fi

# We cannot determine from securityfs if EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is set, so we set it unless EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set.
if [ $((evm_value & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) -ne "$EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES" ] && [ "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ]; then
	echo "$EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE" > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null
fi

evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm)

expect_pass check_create_file
cleanup_create_file
expect_pass check_cp_preserve_xattrs
cleanup_cp_preserve_xattrs
expect_pass check_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner
cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner
expect_pass check_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner
cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner
expect_pass check_metadata_change
cleanup_metadata_change
expect_pass check_evm_revalidate
cleanup_evm_revalidate
expect_pass check_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal
cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal
expect_pass check_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list
cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list